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The following pages contain brief summaries of circuit splits 
identified by federal court of appeals opinions announced between 
February 18, 2014 and September 4, 2014.  This collection, written by the 
members of the Seton Hall Circuit Review, is organized into civil and 
criminal matters, and then by subject matter and court. 
Each summary briefly describes a current circuit split, and is 
intended to give only the briefest synopsis of the circuit split, not a 
comprehensive analysis.  This compilation makes no claim to be 
exhaustive, but aims to serve the reader well as a referential starting point. 
Preferred citation for the summaries below: Circuit Splits, 11 SETON 
HALL CIR. REV. [n] (2014). 
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CIVIL 
ADMIRALTY TORTS 
Standard of care – Maritime rescue doctrine: Barlow v. Liberty Mar. 
Corp., 746 F.3d 518 (2d Cir. 2014) 
The 2nd Circuit addressed whether the “maritime rescue doctrine”, 
under which “a would-be rescuer, faced with an emergency, can only be 
held contributory liable for injuries resulting from his rescue attempt, if 
his conduct was reckless and wanton,” is the proper standard of care to be 
applied to maritime torts.  Id. at 524.  The 4th Circuit determined that “the 
wanton and reckless standard reflects the value society places upon rescue 
as much as any desire to avoid a total defeat of recovery under common 
law,” while the 9th and 5th Circuits held similarly.  Id. at 525.  The 2nd 
Circuit noted that “the rescue doctrine originated at a time when 
contributory negligence was an absolute bar to recovery.”  Id. at 525.  The 
court noted that “maritime law has long used comparative fault in 
resolving competing claims of negligence between the injured and the 
tortfeasor, and today a majority of the states do the same.”  Id. at 525–26.  
The court reasoned that, because “under comparative negligence, of 
course, even a negligent rescuer can recover . . . the principal justification 
for the rescue doctrine — encouraging rescue — has largely disappeared.”  
Id. at 526.  Thus, the 2nd Circuit distinguished itself and concluded that 
the maritime standard of care “in comparative negligence jurisdictions is 
that rescuers must act reasonably under emergency circumstances.”  Id. 
BANKRUPTCY 
Final Judgment Rule – Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005: Bullard v. Hyde Park Sav. Bank (In re Bullard), 
752 F.3d 483 (1st Cir. 2014) 
The 1st Circuit considered whether a Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s 
(“BAP”) “order denying confirmation is per se not a final order appealable 
under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1) of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act (“BAPCPA”) and can be final, but should be 
presumed to be final unless the appellee can show otherwise.”  Id. at 486.  
The court noted that jurisdictional statutes should not be construed too 
liberally, because then “parties will run to the court of appeals for higher 
advice at every stage of the bankruptcy proceedings.”  Id.  However, the 
court recognized that if statutes were construed too stringently, it would 
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“require[e] case-by-case, fact-intensive review . . . .”  Id.  The 1st Circuit 
held, consistent with the 2nd, 6th, 8th, 9th and 10th Circuits, that “an 
intermediate appellate court’s affirmance of a bankruptcy court’s denial of 
confirmation of a reorganization plan is not a final order appealable under 
§ 158(d)(1) so long as the debtor remains free to propose an amended 
plan.”  Id. at 489. 
 
Orders Denying Stay of Relief – Appealability: Pinpoint IT Services, 
LLC v. Rivera (In re Atlas IT Exp. Corp.), 761 F.3d 177 (1st Cir. 2014). 
The 1st Circuit addressed whether orders denying stays of relief are 
appealable as final judgments.  Id. at 182.  The court started by noting that 
all of the Circuits have agreed that orders granting stays relief are final and 
appealable, however there is a circuit split regarding whether the denial of 
a stay is final and appealable.  Id. at 183.  The 1st Circuit refers to the 
majority approach as “the blanket rule,” which categorically allows for 
appeals of orders either granting or denying stays.  Id.  However, the 
minority view, exemplified by the 3rd Circuit, takes into account the status 
of the case itself to determine if the order is truly “final,” or whether the 
District Court below can still engage in considerable activity.  Id.  The 1st 
Circuit ultimately sided with the 3rd Circuit’s approach, and concluded 
that appealability is determined by “whether that edict definitively decided 
a discrete, fully-developed issue that is not reviewable somewhere else.”  
Id. at 185. 
Secured Status Determination – U.S.C. § 506(b): Prudential Ins. Co. 
of Am. v. SW Boston Hotel Venture, LLC (In re SW Boston Hotel 
Venture, LLC), 748 F.3d 393 (1st Cir. 2014) 
The 1st Circuit addressed whether to “uphold the bankruptcy court’s 
application of the flexible approach” in determining secured status and 
collateral value in a bankruptcy proceeding.  Id. at 405.  The court noted 
that “several circuits,” including the 5th Circuit, have adopted a “single-
valuation” approach, where the determination of over-security for § 506(b) 
purposes always occurs at a fixed point in time.  Id.  The court noted that 
“other circuits,” including the 11th Circuit, have adopted a “‘flexible’ 
approach, giving the bankruptcy court discretion to determine the 
appropriate measuring date based on the circumstances of the case.”  Id.  
In addition, the court recognized that the Bankruptcy Court adopted the 
flexible approach.  Id.  The court noted that “neither § 506(b)’s language, 
nor its legislative history, nor the bankruptcy rules define the measuring 
date of post-petition interest” which suggests flexibility.  Id.  The 1st 
Circuit concluded that “at least in the circumstances presented here, a 
152 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 11:145 
bankruptcy court, may, in its discretion, adopt a flexible approach.”  Id.  
Thus, the 1st Circuit agreed with the 11th Circuit, and held that “under the 
particular facts presented in this case, the bankruptcy court did not err in 
adopting a flexible approach for determining oversecured status.” 
 
Standing – Parties in Interest: In re C.P. Hall Co. v. Columbia Casualty 
Co., 750 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 2014) 
The 7th Circuit addressed whether 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b), defining 
parties in interest, entitles a debtor’s excess insurer the right to intervene 
in a bankruptcy settlement.  Id. at 661.  The Court noted that the 2nd, 10th, 
and 11th Circuits found that the interest of an entity that “may suffer 
collateral damage from a bankruptcy proceeding” is too remote to entitle 
that entity to intervene in a bankruptcy proceeding.  Id. at 661.  The court 
distinguished the facts of this case from opinions in the 3rd and 9th 
Circuits, where those courts found that insurers of the debtor were entitled 
to object to settlements because their injuries were more than probabilistic 
and the bankruptcy settlements in question affected the insurer’s rights.  Id 
at 662-63.  Thus, the 7th Circuit concluded, in line with the 2nd, 10th, and 
11th Circuits, that because the excess insurer’s loss was too remote and 
the excess insurer was not a party in interest as defined by 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1109(b), there was no right to intervene in a settlement negotiation 
between two other parties.  Id. 661–62. 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Appellate Jurisdiction – Collateral Order Doctrine: Cobra Natural 
Res., LLC v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 742 F.3d 82 (4th 
Cir. 2014) 
The 4th Circuit addressed “whether a Commission decision granting 
temporary reinstatement to a coal miner is immediately appealable by the 
coal operator under the collateral order doctrine.”  Id. at 88.  The court 
recognized that the collateral order doctrine only allows the immediate 
review of important issues that have been definitively decided and would 
be unreviewable after entering final judgment.  Id. at 86.  The court noted 
that the 11th and 7th Circuits determined that appellate jurisdiction is 
appropriate.  Id.  However, the court disagreed with the 11th and 7th 
Circuits as the 11th Circuit rendered its decision more than two decades 
ago and the 7th Circuit’s resolution was resolved in a somewhat cursory 
fashion.  Id.  Thus the 4th Circuit concluded “the collateral order doctrine 
does not permit an interlocutory review of the proceedings below.” Id. at 
92. 
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Banking Law – Citizenship: Rouse v. Wachovia Mortg., FSB, 747 F.3d 
707 (9th Cir. 2014) 
The 9th Circuit addressed “whether, under 28 U.S.C. § 1348, a 
national bank is a citizen of both the state in which its principal place of 
business is located and the state where its main office is located as 
designated in the bank’s articles of association.”  Id. at 709.  The court 
noted that the Supreme Court previously held that a national bank is a 
citizen of the “state where its main office is located.”  Id. at 710.  Further, 
the court noted that, following the Supreme Court decision, the 8th Circuit 
held that “a national bank is ‘located’ only in the state in which its main 
office is located.”  Id. at 712.  While the 1st, 6th and 7th Circuits agree that 
banks can only be citizens of the state in which its main office is located, 
the 2nd and 4th Circuits have found that national banks may be citizens of 
two or more states.  Id. at 710-11.  The 9th Circuit posited that when 
“interpreting congressional intent, we look to the time of Congress’s 
enactment of the legislation.” Id. at 714.  Agreeing with the 1st, 6th, and 
7th Circuits, the 9th Circuit concluded that “a national bank is a citizen of 
the state in which its main office is located.”  Id. at 709. 
 
First to File Bar – Pending Action: United States ex rel. Shea v. Cellco 
P’ship, 748 F.3d 338 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
The D.C. Circuit addressed whether the first-to-file bar applies only 
while the first-filed action remains pending. Id. at 343.  The court stated 
that the 4th, 7th, 10th Circuits have held that the first-to-file bar only 
applies when the first-filed action remains pending.  Id.  Further, the court 
noted that the 7th and 10th Circuits only addressed the issue in dicta and 
that the 4th Circuit had twice considered the meaning of “pending” as a 
controlling issue but that it had based its decision on the 10th Circuit’s 
understanding.  Id. at 344.  Interpreting the applicable statute, the court 
reasoned that the plain meaning of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5) “makes clear 
that the bar commences when a person brings an action under this 
subsection and thence forth bars any action based on the facts underlying 
the pending action.” Id.  The D.C. Circuit rejected the reasoning of the 4th, 
7th, and 10th Circuits, and held that “the first-to-file bar applies even if the 
initial action is no longer pending,” because the court interpreted 
“‘pending’ in the statutory phrase ‘pending action’ to distinguish the 
earlier-filed action from the later-filed action.”  Id.  at 344. 
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Guilty Pleas – Authorization: United States v. Harden, 758 F.3d 886 
(7th Cir. 2014) 
The 7th Circuit addressed whether magistrate judges can accept 
guilty pleas under the Federal Magistrates Act with a defendant’s consent.  
Id. at 888.  The court noted that the 4th, 10th and 11th Circuits found that 
magistrate judges have the authority to accept felony guilty pleas.  Id. at 
891.  The 7th Circuit found that while a magistrate judge may conduct a 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) colloquy for the purpose of making a report or 
recommendation, a magistrate judge cannot accept a defendant’s guilty 
pleas because it violates the Federal Magistrates Act.  Id.  The court 
disagreed with the 4th, 10th, and 11th Circuits’ statements that “Congress 
intended to give federal judges significant leeway to experiment with 
possible improvements in the efficiency of the judicial process.”  Id.  Thus 
the 7th Circuit concluded that magistrate judges violate the Federal 
Magistrate Act by accepting guilty pleas.  Id. 
 
Justiciability – Exhaustion of Remedies: Rundgren v. Wash. Mut. 
Bank, FA, 760 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 2014) 
The 9th Circuit addressed whether mortgage borrowers claims are 
affirmative defenses that are exempt from Financial Institutions Reform, 
Recovery, and Enforcement Act’s (“FIRREA”) exhaustion requirement.   
Id. at 1062–63.  The court noted that the 1st Circuit determined that “it did 
not matter ‘who happens to be the plaintiff’ because ‘[t]he purpose of the 
exhaustion requirement is to make persons with claims against bank funds 
or property submit them promptly in a single administrative forum.’” Id. 
at 1063.  The 9th Circuit disagreed with the 1st Circuit because “a 
borrower’s claim that the bank is not entitled to foreclose due to past 
misdeeds plainly satisfies the criterion of being a ‘claim relating to any act 
or omission’ of a bank.”  Id. at 1064.  Thus the 9th Circuit concluded that 
the mortgage borrowers claims were not affirmative defenses exempt from 
FIRREA’s exhaustion requirement.  Id. 
 
Tax Deficiency – Third Party Intervention in Citizens’ Deficiency 
Proceedings: Huff v. Comm’r of IRS, 743 F.3d 790 (11th Cir. 2014) 
The 11th Circuit addressed whether the Internal Revenue Service 
(“IRS”) correctly brought a deficiency action against taxpayers that had 
paid their taxes to the Virgin Islands stating that the taxpayers were not 
bona fide residents of the Virgin Islands.  Id.  The Virgin Islands moved 
to intervene but the Tax Court denied intervention and appeal was filed.  
2014] Current Circuit Splits 155 
Id.  The 11th Circuit noted that the Tax Court has previously stated that 
the Virgin Islands attempt to intervene using Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) does 
not allow intervention as a matter of right.  Id. at 794.  Additionally, the 
court determined that the Virgin Islands have not been found to have a 
qualifying interest that allows such intervention in delinquency 
proceedings such as these.  Id.  The Court noted that the 3rd and 8th 
Circuits have reached the same conclusion, but argued that the Virgin 
Islands intervention should instead be required to satisfy Rule 24(b)(3), 
requiring a court to decide whether “the intervention will unduly delay or 
prejudice the adjudication of the original parties’ rights.”  Id. 795.  In 
contrast, the 4th Circuit held that the Tax Court used the correct permissive 
intervention standard and reached a proper denial of intervention.  Id.  The 
11th Circuit agreed with the 3rd and 8th Circuits and concluded that Rule 
24(a)(2) is the proper standard for deciding if intervention by a third party 
is proper.  Id. 
 
 
 
 
 
CIVIL RIGHTS 
 
Fair Housing Act – Disparate Impact Claims: Inclusive Communities 
Project, Inc. v. Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 747 F.3d 275 (5th 
Cir. 2014) 
The 5th Circuit addressed the “correct legal standard to be applied in 
disparate impact claims under the [Fair Housing Act (“FHA”)]”.  Id. at 
276.  The court noted that its “sister circuits have applied multiple different 
legal standards to similar claims under the FHA.”  Id. at 281.  The court 
recognized that the 2nd and 3rd Circuits “require a defendant to bear the 
burden of proving that there are no less discriminatory alternatives to a 
practice that results in a disparate impact,” while the 8th and 10th Circuits 
“place the burden on the plaintiff to prove that there are less discriminatory 
alternatives.”  Id.  In addition, the court noted that the 7th Circuit “applied 
a four-factor balancing test rather than burden-shifting, while the 4th and 
6th Circuits “applied a four-factor balancing test to public defendants and 
a burden-shifting approach to private defendants.”  Id.  The 5th Circuit 
followed the 2nd and 3rd Circuits and adopted a “three-step burden-
shifting approach” because “these standards are in accordance with 
disparate impact principles and precedent.”  Id. 
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COMMUNICATIONS LAW 
 
Definitions – Federal Communications Act: J&J Sports Prods. v. 
Mandell Family Ventures, LLC., 751 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 2014) 
The 5th Circuit addressed whether § 605(a) of the Federal 
Communication Act (“FCA”) encompasses a receipt or inception of 
communications by wire from a cable system.  Id. at 351.  The court noted 
that the 3rd and 7th Circuits held that the 2nd Circuit’s interpretation of 
§ 605(a) “unacceptably blurs the line between radio and wire 
communications, which are separately defined terms that both refer to 
instrumentalities incidental to transmission of the communication.”  Id. at 
352 (internal quotations omitted).  The court noted that the 2nd Circuit 
concluded that the “definition for radio communications extends to all 
instrumentalities, facilities, apparatus, and services . . . ”  Id. (internal 
citations omitted).  Thus, the 5th Circuit joined the 3rd and 7th Circuits in 
holding that § 605(a) does not encompass receipt of communications by 
wire from a cable system.  Id. at 353. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Civil Rights – Remedies against State Actors: Campbell v. Forest 
Pres. Dist., 752 F.3d 665 (7th Cir. 2014) 
The 7th Circuit addressed whether 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which prohibits 
racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of private as well as 
public contracts, “provide[s] a remedy against state actors independent of 
42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Id. at 667.  The court noted that the 9th Circuit 
determined that, although “the amended 42 U.S.C. § 1981 does not 
expressly authorize private claimants to sue state actors directly,” the 
Supreme Court intended to imply a remedy because of the Court’s 
previously inferred remedy against private actors.  Id. at 671.  The 7th 
Circuit disagreed with the 9th Circuit and noted that Congress’s creation 
of a specific remedy against state actors under § 1983 counsels against 
inferring a remedy against them under § 1981.  Id.  The 7th Circuit joined 
the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 10th Circuits in holding that “§ 1983 remains the 
exclusive remedy for violations of § 1981 committed by state actors.”  Id. 
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First Amendment – Free Speech: Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate 
Veterans, Inc. v. Vandergriff, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 13507 (5th Cir. 
2014) 
The 5th Circuit addressed whether the decision of a governmental 
board to reject a specialty license plate containing a Confederate battle flag 
is government speech or private speech.  Id. at *10.  The court noted that 
the 6th Circuit “held that a specialty license plate was governmental 
speech.”  Id. at *19.  The 5th Circuit observed that the 6th Circuit’s 
conclusion made it the sole outlier among the circuits.  Id.  The court noted 
that the 4th, 7th, 8th, and 9th Circuits have all held that specialty license 
plates were private speech.  Id.  Furthermore, the court distinguished the 
case before the 6th Circuit because it involved a license plate specifically 
commissioned by the state government.  Id.  Thus, the court concluded 
that specialty license plates are private speech.  Id. at *21. 
 
Second Amendment– Concealed Weapons: Peruta v. County of San 
Diego, 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014) 
The 10th Circuit addressed whether or not a state may require an 
individual to apply for a permit to carry a concealed weapon or if that 
requirement violates a citizen’s right to bear arms.  Id. at 1147.  The court 
noted that the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Circuits have held that as long as a state 
can show a “justifiable need” for restrictive permit requirements, they do 
not violate a citizen’s right to bear arms.  Id.  However, the 10th Circuit 
disagreed and sided with the 7th Circuit’s interpretation that statutes 
requiring a citizen to “show cause” run afoul of the privileges and 
protections provided for by the Second Amendment.  Id. at 1149.  The 10th 
Circuit recognized the right of an individual to bear arms, which it 
interpreted as the right to carry a weapon in case of confrontation.  Id. at 
1179. 
CONTRACTS 
Forum Selection Clause – Choice of Law:  Jackson v. Payday Fin., 2014 
U.S. App. LEXIS 16257 (7th Cir. 2014) 
The 7th Circuit addressed whether a forum selection clause in a 
contract was valid.  Id. at *16.   The court noted that where there is no 
controlling federal statute the court is “without clear guidance from the 
Supreme Court; It has not yet decided the Erie issue of which law governs 
when, as here, a federal court, sitting in diversity, evaluates a forum 
selection clause in the absence of a controlling federal statute.”  Id. at *18–
19 (internal quotations marks omitted).  The court noted the 8th, 9th, 5th, 
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2nd, 11th, and 3rd Circuits “hold that the enforceability of a forum 
selection clause implicates federal procedure and should therefore be 
governed by federal law.”  Id. at *19 (internal quotations marks omitted).  
The 7th Circuit took a different approach, stating that “the law designated 
in the choice of law clause would be used to determine the validity of the 
forum selection clause.”  Id. at *19.  Thus, the 7th Circuit rejected the 
reasoning of the majority of circuits and deferred to the law stated in the 
forum selection clause of a contract where there is no controlling federal 
statute in diversity jurisdiction cases.  Id. 
COPYRIGHT LAW 
Copyright Infringement – Mobile Phone Software: Oracle Am., Inc. 
v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (9th Cir. 2014) 
The 9th Circuit addressed what test should be “employed when 
attempting to draw the line between what is protectable expression and 
what is not[,]” specifically attempting to define whether the “non-literal 
elements of a computer program constitute protectable expression.”  Id. at. 
1357.  The 6th Circuit found that principles or merger and scenes a faire 
should not be assessed in the infringement analysis but rather “as a 
component of copyrightability.”  Id.  The 9th Circuit held that “scenes a 
faire [is] a defense to infringement rather than . . . a barrier to 
copyrightability.”  Id.  The 1st Circuit found that “methods of operation 
are means by which a user operates something and any words used to 
effectuate that operation are unprotected expression.”  Id. at 1357.  
Alternatively, the 3rd Circuit found that “everything not necessary to the 
purpose or function of a work is expression.”  Id.  The 2nd Circuit 
considered the merger doctrine in order to determine if actionable 
infringement has occurred, “rather than whether a copyright is valid.”  Id.  
The 9th Circuit joined the 2nd Circuit, holding that “although an element 
of a work may be characterized as a method of operation, that element may 
nevertheless contain expression that is eligible for copyright protection,” 
and rejecting the “assumption that, once any separable idea can be 
identified in a computer program everything else must be protectable 
expression, on grounds that more than one idea may be embodied in any 
particular program.” Id. 
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DEBT COLLECTION LAW 
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act– Disputed Debt: Clark v. Absolute 
Collection Serv., 741 F.3d 487 (4th Cir. 2014) 
The 4th Circuit addressed whether the Fair Debt Protection Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 1692(g)(a) permits a consumer to dispute the validity of a debt 
orally, or whether it imposes a writing requirement.  Id. at 489.  The court 
noted that the 3rd Circuit has held that there is a writing requirement to 
satisfy the statute.  Id.  In addition, the 3rd Circuit considered the 
legislative purpose behind the statute.  Id.  However, the 4th Circuit 
stressed the importance of separation of power and plain language.  Id.  
The Court noted that its sole purpose to enforce non-absurd language in 
statutes according to the text.  Id. at 491.  The 4th Circuit, joining the 2nd 
and 9th Circuits, concluded that § 1692(g)(a) does not require the debt 
dispute to be in writing.  Id. 
EDUCATION LAW 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act – Stay-Put Provision: M.R. 
v. Ridley Sch. Dist., 744 F.3d 112 (3d Cir. 2014) 
The 3rd Circuit addressed whether the stay-put provision provides 
for “the right to interim funding, if applicable, [to] extend[ ] through the 
time of a judicial appeal.”  Id. at 115.  The court noted that the D.C. Circuit 
determined that Congress did not intend stay-put financing to cover federal 
appellate review, while the 9th Circuit found that stay-put obligation 
extends through appeals decision.  Id. at 125.  The 3rd Circuit reasoned 
that the “text [of § 1415(j)] is broadly written to encompass the pendency 
of any proceeding conducted pursuant to this section.”  Id.  The 3rd Circuit 
agreed with the 9th Circuit and concluded that “the statutory language and 
the ‘protective purposes’ of the stay-put provision lead to the conclusion 
that Congress intended stay-put placement to remain in effect through the 
final resolution of the dispute.”  Id. 
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 
False Claims Act – Employer Liability: Foglia v. Renal Ventures 
Mgmt., LLC, 754 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2014) 
The 3rd Circuit addressed what a plaintiff must show at the pleading 
stage to satisfy the “particularity” requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) in 
the context of a claim under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C.S. § 3729 et 
seq.  Id. at 155.  The court noted that the “[t]he 4th, 6th, 8th, and 11th 
Circuits have held that a plaintiff must show ‘representative samples’ of 
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the alleged fraudulent conduct, specifying the time, place, and content of 
the acts and the identity of the actors,” while, “[t]he 1st, 5th, and 9th 
Circuits  . . .  have taken a more nuanced approach regarding the 
heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) by holding that it is 
sufficient for a plaintiff to allege ‘particular details of a scheme to submit 
false claims paired with reliable indicia that lead to a strong inference that 
claims were actually submitted.’”  Id. at 156.  The 3rd Circuit agreed with 
the 1st, 5th, and 9th Circuits, and held that the more “nuanced” approach 
provides defendants fair notice of the plaintiff’s claims.  Id. at 157. 
 
Family and Medical Leave Act – Leave to Care for a Family Member: 
Ballard v. Chi. Park Dist., 741 F.3d 838 (7th Cir. 2014) 
The 7th Circuit addressed whether or not providing physical and 
emotional care for a terminally ill person constituted “caring for” within 
the meaning of the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 2612(a)(1)(C), even though the treatment was not part of the regimented 
care.  Id. at 840.  The court noted that the 1st and 9th Circuits determined 
that “care” had to be related to ongoing medical treatment.  Id. at 842.  The 
court disagreed with the 1st and 9th Circuits, as the circumstances 
involved in both cases cited were distinguishable, thus creating a circuit 
split.  Id.  The 7th Circuit concluded that so long as the employee attends 
to a family member’s basic medical, hygienic, or nutritional needs, that 
employee is caring for the family member within the meaning of the 
FMLA, even if that care is not part of ongoing treatment of the condition.  
Id. 
 
Fair Labor Standards Act – Offsetting Overtime Payment: Haro v. 
City of Los Angeles, 745 F. 3d 1249 (1st Cir. 2014) 
The 1st Circuit addressed how previously-paid overtime should be 
offset under the Fair Labor Standard Act, 29 U.S.C § 207(a) by either 
using a week-by-week calculation or by using a cumulative approach.  Id. 
at 1261.  The court noted that the 6th and 7th Circuits determined that a 
week-by-week offset should be used to calculate offsets, while the 5th and 
11th Circuits found that “previously-paid overtime can be cumulatively 
offset against the damages calculated.”  Id. at 1255, 1260.  The 1st Circuit 
agreed with the 6th and 7th Circuits in finding that under 29 U.S.C 
§ 207(a), “compensation already paid for work done within one workweek 
should not be transferrable and offset against overtime due in another 
workweek.” Id. at 1260.  The court disagreed with the 5th and 11th 
Circuits, as the case law set forth supporting the cumulative approach was 
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either summarily decided or inapposite in this case.  Id.  Thus the 1st 
Circuit concluded that previously-paid overtime should be offset using a 
week-by-week calculation.  Id. at 1261. 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
Critical Habitats – Endangered Species Act: San Luis & Delta-Mendota 
Water Auth. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 2014) 
The 9th Circuit addressed “whether [National Environmental Policy 
Act (“NEPA”)] applies to the designation of critical habitats under Section 
4 of the [Endangered Species Act].”  Id. at 649, n. 50.  The court held that 
NEPA is not applicable to the designation of a critical habitat under the 
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (“ESA”)  Id. at 648.  The 9th 
Circuit stated that the procedures already in place for designating a critical 
habitat under the ESA were sufficient and requiring compliance with 
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) when designating would be 
superfluous.  Id. at 649. The 10th Circuit disagreed with the holdings of 
the 9th Circuit whereby the 9th Circuit stated the NEPA was not necessary 
to designate critical habitats.  Id. at 649, n. 50.  The 9th Circuit noted that 
all of the goals of the NEPA, such as public notice, were incorporated into 
the procedures for designation of critical habitats under Section 4 of the 
ESA.  Id. at 649. The 9th Circuit concluded that the National 
Environmental Policy Act was not applicable to designation of critical 
habitats.  Id. 
IMMIGRATION 
Administrative Agency Discretion – Immigration and Naturalization 
Act: Silva-Trevino v. Holder, 742 F.3d 197 (5th Cir. 2014) 
The 5th Circuit addressed the question of whether the Immigration 
and Naturalization Act (“INA”) is sufficiently ambiguous to allow for the 
consideration of additional evidence in accordance with the Attorney 
General’s three-step approach to determining crimes involving moral 
turpitude.  Id. at 200.  The court noted that while the 3rd, 4th, 9th and 11th 
Circuits withheld deference and determined that the statute’s language was 
unambiguous, the 7th and 8th Circuits found the opposite.  Id.  The 5th 
Circuit agreed with the 3rd, 4th, 9th and 11th Circuits, reasoning that, “if 
Congress intended for immigration judges to consider extrinsic evidence 
to classify a conviction as a crime of moral turpitude, the legislators would 
have included language to that effect.”  Id. at 201.  In so reasoning, the 
court disagreed with the 7th and 8th Circuits, noting that “Congress is 
aware of the universal judicial interpretation of the ‘convicted of’ clause 
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of § 212, and we can assume that Congress expects us to abide by that 
construction.”  Id. at 203.  Thus, the 5th Circuit concluded that its own 
precedent prohibits an inquiry into extrinsic evidence, and that such 
inquiries are “only viable when Congress has not spoken directly to the 
statutory question before the court.”  Id. at 205. 
Statutory Interpretation – Immigration and Nationality Act: Bautista 
v. AG of the U.S., 744 F.3d 54 (3d Cir. 2014) 
The 3rd Circuit addressed the issue of whether the jurisdictional 
element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(“INA”) is necessary for a state attempted arson conviction to qualify as 
an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 101(a)(43)(E).  Id. at 64.  The court 
noted that the 5th, 7th, and 9th Circuits determined that Congress intended 
that the “interstate commerce” element of the federal statute supports the 
notion that the jurisdictional requirement is distinct from the substantive 
nature of the offense.  Id. at 72.  The 3rd Circuit agreed with the 5th, 7th, 
and 9th Circuits in finding that the penultimate sentence of § 101(a)(43)(E) 
conveys Congress’s intent to qualify more than a negligible number of 
state convictions as aggravated felonies.  Id. at 64.  However, the court 
disagreed with the 5th, 7th, and 9th Circuits, and concluded that “the 
structure of § 101(a)(43)(E) evidences Congress’s intent to accomplish 
that objective through the use of ‘described in’ rather than ‘defined in’ as 
a means to always discard jurisdictional elements of federal felonies for 
the purposes of § 101(a)(43)(E).”  Id.  The court noted that if Congress had 
intended to exclude the jurisdictional element of all federal statutes from 
the categorical approach analysis, it could simply have included a different 
penultimate sentence stating that jurisdictional elements should be 
ignored, as it clearly expressed its directives regarding specific subsections 
elsewhere in § 101(a)(43).  Id.  The 3rd Circuit concluded since the statute 
of the plaintiff’s arson conviction did not contain the jurisdictional element 
of § 833(i), the conviction is not an aggravated felony under 
§ 101(a)(43)(E)(i) because the state statute does not require a nexus with 
interstate commerce.  Id. at 68. 
Waiver of Status Post Conviction – Eligibility of Waiver: Roberts v. 
Holder, 745 F. 3d 928 (8th Cir. 2014) 
The 8th Circuit addressed whether the aggravated felony bar to a 
waiver of aggravated felony conviction found in 8 U.S.C. § 112(h) applies 
to alien immigrants who attain Lawful Permanent Resident status post-
admission to the United States.  Id. at 933.  The court noted that the 3rd, 
4th, 5th, and 11th Circuits found that a person must have entered or been 
admitted to the Unites States as a Lawful Permanent Resident in order for 
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the aggravated felony bar to apply to them.  Id. at 932  The 8th Circuit 
disagreed with the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 11th Circuits, in finding that the 
Bureau of Immigration Appeals’ reasonable construction of the statute is 
correct and that relief is unavailable for any alien convicted of an 
aggravated felony as a Lawful Permanent Resident, regardless of how such 
status was acquired.  Id.  The court disagreed with the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 
11th Circuits as the ambiguity in the immigration statutes makes the 
Bureau of Immigration Appeals’ interpretation reasonable.  Id.  Thus the 
8th Circuit concluded that the defendant was not entitled to review of his 
status.  Id. at 935. 
LABOR LAW 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 – Statute of 
Limitations: Fish v. Greatbanc Trust Co., 749 F.3d 671 (7th Cir. 2014) 
The 7th Circuit addressed what constitutes “actual knowledge” in the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act’s (“ERISA”) statute of 
limitations, which “bars an action if it is commenced more than three years 
after the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the 
breach or violation.”  Id. at 678.  The court noted that the 3rd Circuit 
determined that the three-year bar only applies when “the plaintiff knows 
not only the facts underlying the alleged violation but also that those facts 
constitute a violation under ERISA,” while the 5th Circuit “do[es] not 
require knowledge that the law was violated but still demand[s] actual 
knowledge of all material facts necessary to understand that some claim 
exists.”  Id. at 679 (citations omitted).  The court disagreed with the 3rd 
Circuit’s strict test, despite its acknowledging that a strong textual 
argument can be made for it because the statute requires “actual 
knowledge of the breach of violation.”  Id. at 679.  The 7th Circuit joined 
the 5th Circuit in holding that actual knowledge requires “knowledge of 
all material facts but not knowledge of every detail or knowledge of 
illegality.”  Id. 
TAX LAW 
Civil Settlement – Deductibility: Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc. v. 
United States, No. 13-2144, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 15536 (1st Cir. 
2014) 
The 1st Circuit addressed whether, in determining the tax treatment 
of a civil settlement under the False Claims Act (“FCA”) for deduction 
purposes, “a court may consider factors beyond the mere presence or 
absence of a tax characterization agreement between the government and 
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the settling party.”  Id. at *1–*2.  The court noted that in a similar case 
involving an FCA settlement agreement, the 9th Circuit found that the 
characterization and purpose of the settlement agreement determined 
whether or not parties intended the payment to compensate the 
government or punish the taxpayer.  Id. at *11.  However, the 1st Circuit 
disagreed with this holding, and instead found that to focus solely on the 
intent of the parties “would be an anomaly in tax law,” where in 
formulating tax characterizations, courts must focus on the “economic 
reality of the particular transaction.”  Id. at *12.  Thus, the 1st Circuit 
disagreed with the 9th Circuit and held that “in determining the tax 
treatment of an FCA civil settlement, a court may consider factors beyond 
the mere presence or absence of a tax characterization agreement between 
the government and the settling party.”  Id. at *17. 
Notice Requirement – IRS Summons: Jewell v. United States, 749 
F.3d 1295 (10th Cir. 2014) 
The 10th Circuit addressed the issue of “how to interpret the notice 
requirement.”  Id. at 1297.  Four other circuit courts have “acknowledged 
Powell, but have declined to enforce the 23-day requirement as 
mandatory.”  Id. at 1300.  The 1st Circuit has required the government to 
comply with all of the “required administrative steps,” but ignores that 
“the 23-day notice is one the administrative steps required in the tax code.”  
Id.  The 2nd, 6th, and 11th Circuits “assume equitable power to excuse the 
notice defect if the taxpayer was not prejudiced.  Id.  The 5th Circuit 
declined to apply Powell when the IRS violated a separate provision,” 26 
U.S.C. § 7609(d).  Id.  The 10th Circuit followed the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Powell by stating that if the “IRS does not comply with the 
administrative requirements of the Internal Revenue Code, its summons 
are unenforceable,” and therefore, “the 23-day notice requirement is 
mandatory and an administrative requirement of the Internal Revenue 
Code.” Id. at 1300–01. 
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CRIMINAL 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Appeals – Habeas Corpus: Collins v. Sec’y of the Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 742 
F.3d 528 (3d Cir. 2014) 
The 3rd Circuit addressed whether “a claim of cumulative error must 
be presented to the state courts before” seeking a writ of habeas corpus.  
Id. at 542–43.  The court noted that the 5th Circuit determined that 
“cumulative error relief is available so long as the individual errors were 
themselves not procedurally defaulted,” while the 6th, 9th, and 10th 
Circuits found that “cumulative error claims are distinct claims subject to 
exhaustion and procedural default.”  Id. at 542.  The 3rd Circuit agreed 
with the 6th, 9th, and 10th Circuits in finding “that a claim of cumulative 
error must be presented to the state courts before it may provide a basis for 
habeas relief.”  Id. at 543.  Thus, the 3rd Circuit concluded that cumulative 
error claims are subject to exhaustion and procedural default if not 
presented in state court, thus precluding the claim on appeal.  Id. at 542–
43. 
Career Offender Enhancement – United States Sentencing 
Guidelines: Whiteside v. United States, 748 F.3d 541 (4th Cir. 2014) 
The 4th Circuit addressed “whether a federal inmate may use a 28 
U.S.C. § 2255 motion to challenge a sentence that was based on the career 
offender enhancement under the United States Sentencing Guidelines 
(“USSG”) when subsequent case law reveals the enhancement to be 
inapplicable to him.”  Id. at 543.  The court noted that the 8th Circuit held 
that a misapplication of career offender status “is not an error that results 
in a complete miscarriage of justice.”  Id. at 549 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The court also noted that the 7th Circuit held errors related to 
sentences issued under the mandatory Guidelines to be “less serious[,] and 
that as long as the sentence imposed was beneath the statutory maximum 
it was not subject to correction on collateral review.”  Id.  at 550 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The court also noted that the 11th Circuit had 
reached the opposite conclusion and held that “an erroneous career 
offender enhancement amounts to a fundamental miscarriage of justice.”  
Id.  The 4th Circuit agreed with the 11th Circuit’s reasoning, which in turn 
had relied on the Supreme Court’s recent pronouncements. Id. at 551.  
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Thus, the 4th Circuit held that “an erroneous application of the career 
offender enhancement amounts to a fundamental miscarriage of justice 
that is cognizable on collateral review.”  Id. 
Fourth Amendment  – Warrantless Searches: United States v. Noble, 
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 15279 (6th Cir. 2014) 
The 6th Circuit addressed the issue of “how to handle the 
government’s professed waiver given that the consequence of this failure 
is the suppression of evidence against a defendant whose rights were not 
infringed.”  Id. at *43.  The court noted that the 1st and 8th Circuits “hold 
that the government cannot waive the issue of Fourth Amendment 
standing.”  Id.  However, the 3rd Circuit “holds that the government’s 
failure to argue the standing issue before the district court represents a 
waiver that fully extinguishes the argument, even if the government 
catches its error on appeal.”  Id. at *45.  The 9th Circuit reasoned “that 
when a defendant appeals the denial of a motion to suppress . . . the 
defendant continues to bear the burden of showing that he has standing, 
and absent reliance, the government- as the party without the burden of 
persuasion- can raise the standing issue on appeal . . .  however [the 9th 
Circuit] will also treat the government’s failure to raise the standing issue 
in its opening appellate brief as a waiver.”  Id. at *46.  The 6th Circuit 
joined the majority of circuits and concluded “that the government can 
forfeit and waive any objections to the defendant’s Fourth Amendment 
standing.”  Id. at *45. 
Fugitive Disentitlement Statute – Criminal Prosecution: United States 
v. Technodyne, 753 F. 3d 368 (2d Cir. 2014) 
The 2nd Circuit addressed whether, when a claimant under the 
fugitive disentitlement statute, 28 U.S.C. §2466, declines to enter or 
reenter the United States, the government is required to prove that his sole 
purpose was the “avoidance of criminal prosecution.”  Id. at 384.  The 
court noted that the D.C. Circuit determined that the government must 
show that the avoidance of criminal prosecution is a claimant’s sole intent 
for refusing to enter or reenter the United States, while the 9th Circuit 
found that the sole motivating factor of a claimant causing him to remain 
abroad need not be the desire to evade criminal prosecution.  Id.  The 2nd 
Circuit agreed with the 9th Circuit in finding that it is not a requirement 
that a claimant’s desire to avoid criminal prosecution be the sole 
motivating factor of his declining to enter or reenter the United States.  Id.  
The 2nd Circuit concluded that the sole intent of the claimant does not 
have to be the avoidance of criminal prosecution, but if any of the 
claimant’s motivations for declining to enter or reenter the United States 
2014] Current Circuit Splits 167 
is the avoidance of criminal prosecution, the intent standard specified in 
the fugitive disentitlement statute is satisfied.  Id. at 386. 
Removal of Non-Citizens – Eligibility for Relief: Syblis v. AG of the 
U.S., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 15801 (3d Cir. 2014) 
The 3rd Circuit addressed the issue of “whether an inconclusive 
record of conviction is sufficient to satisfy a noncitizen’s burden to 
demonstrate eligibility for relief from removal.”  Id. at *17.  The court 
noted that the 4th, 7th, 9th, and 10th Circuits have held “that an 
inconclusive record of conviction does not satisfy a noncitizen’s burden of 
demonstrating eligibility for relief from removal.”  Id. at *21.  The court 
also noted that the 2nd Circuit reached the opposite conclusion by 
employing a “categorical approach” to find “that presentation of an 
inconclusive record of conviction satisfies a noncitizen’s burden to 
demonstrate that he has not been convicted of an aggravated felony.”  Id. 
at *18.  The court agreed with the 10th Circuit’s reasoning that “[t]he fact 
that [the noncitizen] is not to blame for the ambiguity surrounding his 
criminal conviction does not relieve him of his obligation to prove 
eligibility for discretionary relief.”  Id. The court departed from the 2nd 
Circuit’s interpretation, noting that the 2nd Circuit failed to place the 
appropriate burden on the noncitizen to demonstrate eligibility for relief.  
Id. at *19. Thus, the 3rd Circuit joined the 4th, 7th, 9th, and 10th Circuits 
and held that an inconclusive record of conviction does not satisfy a 
noncitizen’s burden of demonstrating eligibility for relief from removal.”  
Id. at *21. 
Sentencing – Armed Career Criminal Act: United States v. Prater, 2014 
U.S. App. LEXIS 16889 (6th Cir. 2014) 
The 6th Circuit addressed “whether a conviction for third-degree 
burglary under New York law is categorically a violent felony for armed-
career-criminal purposes.”  Id. at *39.  The court noted that the 2nd and 
3rd Circuits determined that a third-degree burglary under New York law 
was a categorically violent felony under the residual clause.  Id. at *37–
*38.  The 6th Circuit disagreed with the 2nd and 3rd Circuits because those 
courts “failed to apply the modified categorical approach, to treat the 
offense as a divisible one, and even to acknowledge that the offense 
encompassed alternative forms other than generic burglary.”  Id. at *37.  
Thus, the 6th Circuit concluded that in order to determine whether a 
conviction for third-degree burglary under New York law is a violent 
felony for armed criminal purposes, a court must apply the modified 
categorical approach in order to determine a violent felony under the 
Armed Career Criminal Act.  Id.  at *1–*2. 
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Sentencing – Resentencing Hearings: United States v. Alvarez, No. 13-
40812, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 13938 (5th Cir. 2014) 
The 5th Circuit addressed whether “resentencing hearings following 
a remand are to be conducted de novo unless expressly limited by the court 
in its order of remand” even when said remand was designed to fix a 
“specific and defined sentencing error.”  Id. at *9–*10.  The 5th Circuit 
noted that the D.C. and 7th Circuits determined resentencing hearings 
which follow a remand need not adhere to this requirement.  Id.  The 5th 
Circuit agreed with the D.C. and 7th Circuits’ position that resentencing 
hearings on remand do not always have to be conducted de novo.  Id at 
*10.  In following these circuits, the 5th Circuit acknowledged that it 
adopts the minority position on the matter.  Id at *9.  Nevertheless, since 
the Matthews factors, which would otherwise demand that a court conduct 
de novo resentencing, do not appear in this case, the 5th Circuit found that 
the general rule on sentencing controls, and concluded “that de novo 
resentencing is improper following a remand for correction of a specific 
and defined sentencing error.”  Id. 
Sentencing – Restitution: United States  v. Farano, 749 F.3d 658 (7th 
Cir. 2014) 
The 7th Circuit addressed the method of calculating restitution when 
the victims were refinancing banks under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3663A(b)(1)(B)(i)(II).  Id. at 666.  Under the statute, the victim is entitled 
to “the value of the [victim’s] property on the date of sentencing, less the 
value (as of the date the property is returned) of any part of the property 
that is returned.”  Id.  The 7th Circuit noted that the 1st, 3rd, 8th, 10th, and 
possibly the 5th Circuits determined that under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3663A(b)(1)(B)(i)(II) the date the property sold is the proper calculation 
for restitution, while the 5th and 9th Circuits held that the foreclosure date 
is determinative.  Id.  The 7th Circuit agreed with the majority of the 
Circuits and concluded that the date of foreclosure or later as the “choice 
of the transaction date to use to measure the restitution.”  Id. at 667.  The 
7th Circuit, however, found that “refinancing banks probably were not 
victims” so the date to calculate restitution was irrelevant.  Id.  Thus the 
7th Circuit concluded that the owners of the original mortgages, but not 
the refinancing banks were entitled to restitution.  Id. 
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Sex Trafficking of Children – Sentencing Enhancement: United States 
v. Pringler, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 16481 (5th Cir. 2014) 
The 5th Circuit addressed “whether the computer use enhancement 
U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(3) applies to uses of the computer beyond the 
scenarios mentioned in application note 4.”  Id. at *14.  The court noted 
that the 4th and 11th Circuits “have found application note 4 inapplicable 
and relied on the plain meaning of the Guideline alone in upholding 
computer use sentencing enhancements under Subsection (3)(B),” while 
the 3rd and 7th Circuits have “each applied application note 4” to the 
subsection.  Id. at *15–*17.  The 5th Circuit agreed with the 4th and 11th 
Circuits, finding that application note 4 “‘ignores the plain meaning’ of 
the Guideline.”  Id. at *16.  The court disagreed with the 3rd and 7th 
Circuits that application note 4 is authoritative.  Id. at *17.  Thus, the 5th 
Circuit concluded that “application note 4 is inconsistent with Subsection 
3(B),” and if they were to give “application note 4 controlling weight, it 
would render Subsection 3(b) inoperable in all but a narrow subset of cases 
under only one of the numerous criminal statutes the Guideline covers.”  
Id. at *18. 
 
CRIMINAL STATUTES 
Hobbs Act – Overt Act Requirement: United States v. Salahuddin, 2014 
U.S. App. LEXIS 17000 (3rd Cir. 2014) 
The 3rd Circuit addressed the issue of “whether an overt act is a 
required element of Hobbs Act conspiracy.”  Id. at *12.  The court noted 
that the 1st, 2nd, and 11th Circuits determined that “an overt act is not a 
required element of Hobbs Act conspiracy,” while the 5th Circuit “requires 
an overt act for Hobbs Act conspiracy.”  Id. at *17–*18.  The 3rd Circuit 
joined the 1st, 2nd and 11th Circuits, which do not require proof of an 
overt act for a conviction in a Hobbs Act conspiracy.  Id. at *19.  The 3rd 
Circuit additionally stated that since the Hobbs Act conspiracy makes no 
mention of a required overt act, the 3rd Circuit decline to read in such 
requirement.  Id. at *16.  Thus, the 3rd Circuit held that an overt act is not 
a required element under a Hobbs Act conspiracy.  Id. at *19. 
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FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Witness – Lay Witness Testimony: United States v. Gadson, 2014 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 15969 (9th Cir. 2014) 
The 9th Circuit addressed Federal Rule of Evidence 701, which gives 
guidance on what testimony by a layperson is admissible.  The court noted 
that both the D.C. and 2nd Circuits have applied this rule “much more 
narrowly[,] and barred officers from interpreting intercepted 
communications based on their review of the recordings and personal 
involvement in an investigation.”  Id. at *37–*38.  The 9th Circuit 
disagreed and found that “a lay witness’s opinion testimony necessarily 
draws on the witness’s own understanding, including wealth of personal 
information, experience, and education that cannot be placed before the 
jury”, and that “if witnesses cannot draw on their experience and 
knowledge, they are effectively limited to presenting factual information.”  
Id. at *38–*39.  The 9th Circuit joined the 1st Circuit and concluded that 
“rule 701 did not impose such a limitation.”  Id. at *39. 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
Jurisdictional Dispute – Pre-Patent Inventorship: Camsoft Data Sys., 
Inc. v. S. Elec. Supply, Inc., 756 F.3d 327 (5th Cir. 2014) 
The 5th Circuit addressed “whether a district court has jurisdiction 
over an inventorship dispute where the contested patent has not yet 
issued.”  Id. at 330.  The court noted that the Federal Circuit determined 
that the “district court[s] . . . have jurisdiction over pre-patent inventorship 
disputes but must dismiss until a patent has issued.  Id. at 336.  The 5th 
Circuit disagreed with the Federal Circuit’s interpretation, reasoning 
instead that “Congress has explicitly vested the Patent and Trademark 
Office with sole discretion over the ‘granting and issuing of patents.’”  Id. 
at 334.  The 5th Circuit noted, “[i]t seems like splitting jurisdictional hairs 
to suggest that the federal courts entertain some kind of pending 
jurisdiction over a dispute whose immediate resolution Congress 
delegated to another forum.”  Id. at 336.  Thus, the 5th Circuit concluded 
that, “district courts have no jurisdiction over an inventorship dispute until 
the disputed patent has issued.” Id. at 333. 
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SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
Fourth Amendment – Third Party Consent to Searches: United 
States v. Peyton, 745 F. 3d 546 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
The D.C. Circuit addressed whether ambiguity as to a third party’s 
apparent authority to consent to searches should be viewed in a light most 
favorable to the police or to the defendant.   Id. at 555.  The court noted 
that the 6th Circuit determined that a third party does not have apparent 
authority to consent to searches where there is an ambiguity as to whether 
the area is one of mutual use.  Id. at 554. The court recognized that the 2nd 
and 7th Circuits found that the defendant bears the risk of uncertainty in 
situations like these because a third party with common authority over the 
premises is presumed to have authority over closed containers, unless the 
police  are positive that the third party does not.  Id.  The D.C. Circuit 
agreed with the 6th Circuit in finding that ambiguity regarding mutual use 
is enough to defeat apparent authority of third parties.  Id.  The court 
disagreed with the 2nd and 7th Circuits as there was both ambiguity and 
positive evidence that the third party had apparent authority to grant a 
search.  Id.  Thus the D.C. Circuit concluded that evidence seized with the 
permission of a third party must be suppressed.  Id. at 556. 
SENTENCING 
Enhancement Applications – 18 U.S.C. § 924(e): United States v. 
Barbour, 750 F.3d 535, 537 (6th Cir. 2014) 
The 6th Circuit addressed the meaning of “committed on occasions 
different from one another” within the statute.   Id. at 539.   The court noted 
that the 7th Circuit has addressed this issue and determined that there was 
no subjective element in the determination, and that the burden falls to the 
government to show that one crime began before the conclusion of the 
other.   Id. at 542.   The 11th Circuit also supported this proposition.  Id. 
at 544.  This approach differed, however, from that of the 9th and the 5th 
Circuits, which each held that the burden was instead on the defendant.   Id. 
at 545   Thus, the 6th Circuit concluded that the burden of determining 
whether two crimes were committed on different occasions for purposes 
of sentencing falls on the government, relying on the reasoning of the 7th 
Circuit’s analysis.   Id. at 543. 
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Enhancement Applications – Causation Standard for Death 
Occurring During Commission of a Crime: United States v. Ramos-
Delgado, No. 13-40367, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12359 (5th Cir. 2014) 
The 5th Circuit addressed “what causation is required under [United 
States Sentencing Guidelines] § 2L1.1(b)(7) when an injury or death 
occurs during the commission of a crime.”  Id. at *4.  While the 5th Circuit 
had not dealt with the issue before, the 8th and 9th Circuits held that the 
Guidelines require “direct or proximate causation.  Id.  The 10th and 11th 
Circuits, on the other hand, have rejected a requirement of proximate 
causation because “[t]he guideline contains no causation requirement and 
we have no license to impose one.”  Id. at *4–*5.  The 5th Circuit agreed 
with the 10th and 11th Circuits, and determined that “the only causation 
requirement is that contained in § 1B1.3, which describes the general 
relevant conduct that may be considered in determining the guideline 
range.”  Id. at *5.  The 5th Circuit noted that “relevant conduct includes 
“all harm that resulted from the acts and omissions specified in subsections 
(a)(1) and (a)(2) above, and all harm that was the object of such acts and 
omissions.”  Id.  The 5th Circuit concluded that “[b]ecause the ordinary 
meaning of ‘resulted from’ imposes a requirement of actual or but-for 
causation and textual and contextual reasons do not justify the use of an 
alternative causation, we conclude that—unless otherwise specified—the 
defendant’s relevant conduct must be a but-for cause of a harm for that 
harm to be considered in assigning the guideline range.”  Id. at *5, *7. 
Probation Dispositions – Revoking Supervised Release: United States 
v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2014) 
The 11th Circuit addressed “whether it is error to consider a factor 
listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) when imposing a sentence after 
revoking supervised release.”  Id. at 1308.  The court noted that the 1st, 
2nd, 3rd, and 6th Circuits held it is not error, while the 4th, 5th, and 9th 
Circuits held that it is error.  Id. at 1309.  The 11th Circuit agreed with the 
4th, 5th, and 9th Circuits, stating that “because it is impermissible to 
consider rehabilitation, a court errs by relying on or considering 
rehabilitation in any way when sentencing a defendant to prison.”  Id. at 
1311.  When rejecting the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Circuit’s reasoning, the 11th 
Circuit stated “we believe our sister Circuits have taken an unnecessary 
narrow view.”  Id.  Thus, the 11th Circuit concluded, “a district court errs 
when it considers rehabilitation when imposing or lengthening a sentence 
of imprisonment.”  Id. at 1310. 
2014] Current Circuit Splits 173 
Restitution – Calculation: United States v. Holmich, 563 F. App’x 483 
(7th Cir. 2014) 
The 7th Circuit addressed whether restitution is to be considered a 
civil or criminal penalty.  Id. at 485.  The court noted that the majority of 
Circuits have determined that restitution is a criminal penalty, while only 
the 8th and 10th Circuits have found it is civil in nature.  Id.  The 7th 
Circuit agreed with the 8th and 10th Circuits in finding that the amount of 
restitution ordered did not need to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt 
after being charged in the indictment   Id. at 485.  The court disagreed with 
the majority of the Circuits, pointing to its holding in U.S. v. Wolfe 701 
F.3d  1206 (7th Cir. 2012), where the court rejected the argument that the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Southern Union Co. v. United States, 132 
S.Ct. 2344 (2012) had established restitution as criminal in nature.  Id.  
Thus, the 7th Circuit concluded restitution is civil in nature, and therefore 
amounts determined and ordered are not required to be proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Id. at 485. 
SENTENCING JUVENILES 
Review of Writ of Habeas Corpus Denial for Imposed Adult Criminal 
Sentences on Juveniles – AEDPA: Goins v. Smith, 556 F. App’x 434 (6th 
Cir. 2014) 
The 6th Circuit addressed whether sentencing a juvenile as an adult 
for 84-years for a non-homicidal crime constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment that violates the Eighth Amendment and whether the reversal 
of a denial of a writ of habeas corpus is warranted.  Id. at 436–37.  The 
Court noted that the 9th Circuit held that a 254 year sentence imposed on 
a juvenile non-homicide offender was improper because such a sentence 
was “materially indistinguishable” from a life sentence without parole.  Id. 
at 437.  In contrast, the 5th Circuit decided that a 45 year sentence for a 
juvenile convicted of conspiracy to use a firearm in relation to a crime of 
violence that resulted in death was not an Eighth Amendment violation 
and permissible.  Id.  The 6th Circuit held, consistent with the 5th Circuit, 
that an 84-year sentence imposed on a juvenile was not cruel or unusual 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment based on the circumstances of 
the juvenile’s actions and that the Eighth Amendment’s proportionality 
requirement does not demand consideration of juvenile status.  Id. 434. 
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STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
Prior Convictions Constituting Violent Felonies – ACCA Sentencing: 
United States v. Chandler, 743 F.3d 648 (9th Cir. 2014) 
The 9th Circuit addressed whether a conviction for conspiracy is 
considered a violent felony when sentencing under the Armed Career 
Criminal Act (“ACCA”) for an individual who enters a guilty plea for 
possession of a firearm.  Id. at 649.  The Court recognized that the 1st, 3rd, 
4th, 5th, and 8th Circuits have held that conspiracy may qualify as a violent 
felony.  Id. at 661.  While the 10th and 11th Circuits have stated that 
conspiracy does not qualify as a violent felony reasoning that the overt act 
required to be found guilty of conspiracy, does not alone, provide evidence 
that a violent crime has yet to occur.  Id. at 662.  The 9th Circuit joined the 
1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 8th Circuits in holding that conspiracy is considered 
a violent felony for the purposes of enhanced sentencing under the ACCA.  
Id. 
 
